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Abstract. Deep reinforcement learning has been successfully applied to
many control tasks, but the application of such agents in safety-critical
scenarios has been limited due to safety concerns. Rigorous testing of
these controllers is challenging, particularly when they operate in prob-
abilistic environments due to, for example, hardware faults or noisy sen-
sors. We propose MOSAIC, an algorithm for measuring the safety of
deep reinforcement learning agents in stochastic settings. Our approach
is based on the iterative construction of a formal abstraction of a con-
troller’s execution in an environment, and leverages probabilistic model
checking of Markov decision processes to produce probabilistic guaran-
tees on safe behaviour over a finite time horizon. It produces bounds
on the probability of safe operation of the controller for different ini-
tial configurations and identifies regions where correct behaviour can be
guaranteed. We implement and evaluate our approach on agents trained
for several benchmark control problems.
Keywords: Neural Networks · Deep Reinforcement Learning · Formal Verifica-
tion · Markov Decision Process · Probabilistic Model Checking
1 Introduction
Deep reinforcement learning is the application of deep neural networks to solve
reinforcement learning tasks. This technique has been shown to solve many com-
plex control tasks successfully [4,26,23]. However, real-world applications of these
methods, especially in safety-critical scenarios such as autonomous driving, is
limited because it is difficult to establish guarantees on their safety.
Formal verification is a rigorous approach to checking the correctness of com-
puterised systems. It is particularly appealing for systems that are based on
neural networks, because the training process often yields models that are large,
complex and opaque. Furthermore, the input space is typically too large to al-
low exhaustive testing, and there now exist a variety of approaches to construct
adversarial attacks, i.e., small and imperceptible perturbations to the inputs of
the neural network that cause it to produce erroneous outputs.
In recent years, there has been growing interest in verification techniques
for neural networks [17,16,14], with a particular focus on the domain of image
classification. These aim to prove the absence of particular classes of adversarial
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attack, typically those that are “close” to inputs for which the correct output is
known. Methods proposed include mapping the verification to an SMT (satisfi-
ability modulo theories) problem and the use of abstract interpretation.
There are also various approaches to considering safety in reinforcement
learning. For example, the field of safe reinforcement learning [13] factors in
safety objectives into the reinforcement process itself. Using formal specifica-
tions of the learning objective, such as maximising the probability of satisfying
a temporal logic objective, has also been proposed [5,12]. More recently formal
verification of deep reinforcement learning systems has been considered [18], by
leveraging existing neural network verification methods.
A further challenge for verifying the safe operation of controllers synthesised
using deep reinforcement learning is the fact they are often developed to func-
tion in uncertain or unpredictable environments. This necessitates the use of
stochastic models to train, and to reason about, the controllers. One source of
probabilistic behaviour is dynamically changing environments and/or unreliable
or noisy sensing. Another source, and the one we focus on here, is the occurrence
of faults, e.g., in the hardware for actuators in the controller.
In this paper, we propose novel techniques to establish probabilistic guaran-
tees on the safe behaviour of deep reinforcement learning systems which can be
subject to faulty behaviour at runtime. Our approach, which we call MOSAIC
(MOdel SAfe Intelligent Control) uses a combination of abstract interpretation
and probabilistic verification to synthesise the guarantees.
Formally, we model the runtime execution of a deep reinforcement learning
based controller as a continuous-space discrete-time Markov processes (DTMP).
This is constructed from the neural network specifying the controller, a determin-
istic, continuous-space model of a physical environment, and a controller fault
model characterising the probability with which faults occur when attempting
to execute particular control actions. We concern ourselves with finite-horizon
safety specifications and consider the probability with which a failure state is
reached within a specified number of time steps. More precisely, we aim to iden-
tify “safe” regions of the possible initial configurations of the controller, for which
this failure probability is guaranteed to be below some threshold.
We construct a finite-state abstraction of the controller execution model as a
Markov decision process (MDP), comprising abstract states (based on intervals)
that represent regions of the state space of the concrete controller model. We then
numerically solve the MDP to yield upper bounds on the step-bounded failure
probabilities for different initial regions. Constructing the abstraction requires
a symbolic analysis of the neural network representing the controller policy, for
which we design a branch-and-bound algorithm, and an abstraction process that
explores the reachable abstract states of the environment. We can also iteratively
refine the abstraction to yield more accurate bounds on the failure probabilities.
We evaluate our approach by applying it to deep reinforcement learning agents
for two benchmark control problems: a cartpole and a pendulum.
Related Work. As discussed above, various formal verification techniques for
neural networks exist, including those based on abstract interpretation. These
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have seen a rise in popularity since, although incomplete, they can scale to
bigger networks than exact methods. Some algorithms use abstractions based on
intervals [24,28,1], as we do; others use more sophisticated representations such as
polyhedra and zonotopes [14]. Recently correctness for Bayesian neural networks
has been considered, using probabilistic notions of robustness, e.g. [8]. Mostly,
these approaches focus on supervised learning, often for image classification, but
they have also been built upon for verified deep reinforcement learning [18],
where (non-probabilistic) safety and liveness properties are checked. Other, non-
neural network based, reinforcement learning has also been verified, e.g., by
extracting and analysing decision trees [2].
For probabilistic systems, neural networks have been used to find POMDP
policies that are amenable to probabilistic verification [10,9]. In contrast to this
work, recurrent neural networks are used for controllers and the models are
discrete, rather than continuous, state. Also related are techniques to formally
verify continuous space probabilistic models, e.g., [21,27] which build finite-state
abstractions as Markov chains or interval Markov chains.
2 Preliminaries
We will use Dist(X) to denote the set of discrete probability distributions over
the set X, i.e., functions µ : X → [0, 1] where ∑x∈X µ(x) = 1. The support of
µ, denoted Supp(µ), is defined as Supp(µ) = {x ∈ X |µ(x) > 0}. In some cases,
we will use distributions where the set X is uncountable but where the support
is finite. We also write P(X) to denote the powerset of X.
We use two probabilistic models: discrete-time Markov processes (DTMPs)
to model controllers, and Markov decision processes (MDPs) for abstractions.
Definition 1 (Discrete-time Markov process). A (finite-branching) discrete-
time Markov process is a tuple (S, S0,P,AP , L), where: S is a (possibly uncount-
ably infinite) set of states; S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states; P : S × S → [0, 1] is
a transition probability matrix, where
∑
s′∈Supp(P(s,·)) P(s, s
′) = 1 for all s ∈ S;
AP is a set of atomic propositions; and L : S → AP is a labelling function.
The process starts in some initial state s0 ∈ S0 and then evolves from state
to state in discrete time steps. When in state s, the probability of making a
transition to state s′ is given by P(s, s′). We assume that the process is finite-
branching, i.e., the number of possible successors of each state is finite, despite
the continuous state space. This simplifies the representation and suffices for the
probabilistic behaviour that we model in this paper.
A path is an infinite sequence of states s0s1s2 . . . through the model, i.e.,
such that P(si, si+1) > 0 for all i. We write Path(s) for the set of all paths
starting in a state s. In standard fashion [19], we can define a probability space
Prs over Path(s). Atomic propositions from the set AP will be used to specify
properties for verification; we write s |= b for b ∈ AP if b ∈ L(s).
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Definition 2 (Markov decision process). A Markov decision process is a
tuple (S, S0,P,AP , L), where: S is a (countable) set of states; S0 ⊆ S are ini-
tial states; P : S × N × S → [0, 1] is a transition probability function, where∑
s′∈S P(s, j, s
′) ∈ {0, 1} for all s ∈ S, j ∈ N; AP is a set of atomic proposi-
tions; and L : S → AP is a labelling function.
Unlike discrete-time Markov processes above, we assume a countable (usually
finite) state space. A transition in a state s of an MDP first requires a choice
between several possible probabilistic outcomes in that state. Unusually, we do
not use action labels to distinguish these choices, but just integer indices. Pri-
marily, this is to avoid confusion with the use of actions taken by controllers,
which do not correspond directly to these choices. The probability of moving to
successor state s′ when taking choice j in state s is given by P(s, j, s′).
As above, a path is an execution through the model, i.e., an infinite sequence
of states and indices s0j0s1j1 . . . such that P(si, ji, si+1) > 0 for all i, and we
write Path(s) for the set of all paths starting in a state s. A policy of the MDP
selects the choice to take in each state, based on the history of its execution so
far. For a policy σ, we have a probability space Prσs over the set of paths starting
in state s. If ψ is an event of interest defined by a measurable set of paths (e.g.,
those reaching a set of target states), we are usually interested in the minimum
or maximum probability of the event over all policies:
Prmins (ψ) = inf
σ
Prσs (ψ) and Pr
max
s (ψ) = sup
σ
Prσs (ψ)
3 Controller Modelling and Abstraction
In this section, we formalise our approach to modelling and defining safety prop-
erties of deep reinforcement learning controllers, and then describe the MDP
abstraction that underlies our MOSAIC approach to verifying these controllers.
3.1 Controller Execution Model
We consider controllers acting over continuous state spaces systems with a dis-
crete action space. We assume a set of n real-valued state space variables and
denote the state space by S = Rn. There is a finite set Act = {α1, . . . , αm} of
m actions that can be taken by the controller. For simplicity, we assume that all
actions are available in every state.
To describe the execution of a controller, we require three things: (i) a con-
troller policy ; (ii) an environment model ; and (iii) a controller fault model. Each
is described in more detail below.
Definition 3 (Controller policy). A controller policy is a function pi : S →
Act, which selects an action pi(s) for the controller to take in each state s ∈ S.
We restrict our attention to policies that are memoryless (choosing the same
action in each state s) and deterministic (selecting a fixed single action, with
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no randomisation). In this work, policies are represented by neural networks,
and generated through deep reinforcement learning. However, for the purposes
of this section, we treat the policy simply as a function from states to actions.
Definition 4 (Environment model). An environment model is a function
E : S × Act → S that describes the state E(s, α) of the system after one time
step if controller action α is (successfully) taken in state s.
The environment represents the effect that each action executed by a con-
troller has on the system. We assume a deterministic model of the environment;
probabilistic behaviour due to failures is introduced separately (see below).
We also extend E to define the change in system state when a sequence of
zero or more actions are executed, still within a single time step. This will be
used below to describe the outcome of controller execution faults. Re-using the
same notation, for state s ∈ S and action sequence w ∈ Act∗, we write E(s, w)
to denote the outcome of taking actions w in s. This can be defined recursively:
for the empty action sequence , we have E(s, ) = s; and, for a sequence of k
actions α1 . . . αk, we have E(s, α1 . . . αk) = E(E(s, α1 . . . αk−1), αk).
Definition 5 (Controller fault model). A controller fault model is a func-
tion f : Act → Dist(Act∗) that gives, for each possible controller action, the
sequence of actual actions that result and their probabilities.
This lets us model a range of (probabilistic) controller faults. A simple exam-
ple is the case of an action α failing to execute with some probability p: we have
f(α)() = p, f(α)(α) = 1−p and f(α)(w) = 0 for all other action sequences w.
Another example, is a “sticky” action α which executes twice with probability
p, i.e., f(α)(αα) = p, f(α)(α) = 1−p and f(α)(w) = 0 for any other w.
Now, given a controller policy pi, an environment model E and a controller
fault model f , we can formally define the behaviour of the execution of the
controller within the environment. We add two further ingredients: a set S0 ⊆ S
of possible initial states; and a set Sfail ⊆ S of failure states, i.e., states of the
system where we consider it to have failed. We refer to the tuple (pi,E, p, S0, Sfail)
as a controller execution. Its controller execution model is a (continuous-space,
finite-branching) discrete-time Markov process defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Controller execution model). Given a controller execution
(pi,E, p, S0, Sfail), the corresponding controller execution model describing its
runtime behaviour is the DTMP (S, S0,P,AP , L) where AP = {fail}, for any
s ∈ S, fail ∈ L(s) iff s ∈ Sfail and, for states s, s′ ∈ S:
P(s, s′) =
∑
{f(pi(s))(w) | w ∈ Act∗ s.t. E(s, w) = s′} .
For each state s, the action chosen by the policy is pi(s) and the action sequences
that may result are given by the support of the controller fault model f(pi(s)).
For each action sequence w, the resulting state is E(s, w). In the above, to define
P(s, s′) we have combine the probability of all such sequences w that lead to s′
since there may be more than one that does so.
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Recall the simple controller fault model from above where each action fails to
be executed with probability p. The above yields P(s, s) = p and P(s, E(s, α)) =
1−p for each action α. Similarly, a “sticky” action α (with probability p) yields
P(s, E(E(s, α), α)) = p and P(s, E(s, α)) = 1−p.
3.2 Controller Verification
Using the model defined above of a controller operating in a given environment,
our aim is to verify that it executes safely. More precisely, we are interested in
the probability of reaching failure states within a particular time horizon. We
write Prs(♦6kfail) for the probability of reaching a failure state within k time
steps when starting in state s, which can be defined as:
Prs(♦6kfail) = Prs({s0s1s2 · · · ∈ Path(s) | si |= fail for some 0 6 i 6 k})
Since we work with discrete-time, finite-branching models, we can compute finite-
horizon reachability probabilities recursively as follows:
Prs(♦6kfail) =

1 if s |= fail
0 if s 6|= fail ∧ k=0∑
s′∈Supp(P(s,·)) P(s, s
′) · Prs′(♦6k−1fail) otherwise.
For our controller execution models, we are interested in two closely related
verification problems. First, for a specified probability threshold psafe , we would
like to determine the subset Ssafe0 ⊆ S0 of “safe” initial states from which the
error probability is below the threshold:
Ssafe0 = {s ∈ S0 | Prs(♦6kfail) < psafe}
Alternatively, for some set of states S′, typically the initial state set S0, or some
subset of it, we wish to know the maximum (worst-case) error probability:
p+S′ = sup{Prs(♦6kfail) | s ∈ S′}
This can be seen as a probabilistic guarantee over the executions that start in
those states. In this paper, we tackle approximate versions of these problems,
namely under-approximating Ssafe0 or over-approximating p
+
S′ .
3.3 Controller Execution Abstraction
A key challenge in tackling the controller verification problem outlined above
is the fact that it is over a continuous-state model. In fact, since the model
is finite-branching and we target finite-horizon safety properties, for a specific
initial state, the k-step probability of a failure could be computed by solving a
finite-state Markov chain. However, we verify the controller for a set of initial
states, giving infinitely many possible probabilistic executions.
Our approach is to construct and solve an abstraction of the model of con-
troller execution. The abstraction is a finite-state MDP who states are abstract
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states a ⊆ S, each representing some subset of the states of the original concrete
model. We denote the set of all possible abstract states as A ⊆ P(S). In our
approach, we use intervals (i.e., the “Box” domain; see Section 4).
In order to construct the abstraction of the controller’s execution, we build
on an abstraction of the environment E, which we write as Eˆ. Recall that the
environment is a function E : S × Act → S. Then, its abstraction is a function
Eˆ : A×Act → A which soundly over-approximates the (concrete) environment,
i.e., it satisfies the following:
Definition 7 (Environment abstraction). For environment model E : S ×
Act → S and set of abstract states A ⊆ P(S), an environment abstraction is a
function Eˆ : A×Act → A such that: for any abstract state a ∈ A, concrete state
s ∈ a and action α ∈ Act, we have E(s, α) ∈ Eˆ(a, α).
Using interval arithmetic, we can construct Eˆ for a wide range of functions E.
As for E, the environment abstraction Eˆ extends naturally to action sequences,
where Eˆ(a,w) gives the result of taking a sequence w of actions in abstract state
a. It follows from Definition 7 that, for any abstract state a ∈ A, concrete state
s ∈ a and action sequence w ∈ Act∗, we have E(s, w) ∈ Eˆ(a,w).
Our abstraction is an MDP whose states are abstract states from the set
A ⊆ P(S). This represents an over-approximation of the possible behaviour
of the controller, and computing the maximum probabilities of reaching error
states in the MDP will give upper bounds on the actual probabilities in the
concrete model. The choices that are available in each abstract state a of the
MDP are based on a partition of a into subsets {a1, . . . , am}. Intuitively, each
choice represents the behaviour for states in the different subsets aj .
Definition 8 (Controller execution abstraction). For a controller execu-
tion (pi,E, p, S0, Sfail), a set A ⊆ P(S) of abstract states and a corresponding
environment abstraction Eˆ, the controller execution abstraction is defined as an
MDP (A,A0,P,AP , L) satisfying the following:
– for all s ∈ S0, s ∈ a for some a ∈ A0;
– for each a ∈ A, there is a partition {a1, . . . , am} of a that is consistent with
the controller policy pi (i.e., pi(s) = pi(s′) for any s, s′ ∈ aj for each j) and,
for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have:
P(a, j, a′) =
∑{
f(pi(aj))(w) | w ∈ Act∗ such that Eˆ(aj , w) = a′
}
where pi(aj) is the action that pi chooses for all states s ∈ aj;
– AP = {fail} and fail ∈ L(a) iff fail ∈ L(s) for some s ∈ a.
Intuitively, the jth choice of abstract state a represents the behaviour of states
in aj , which we construct by finding the controller action pi(aj) taken in those
states, the possible action sequences w that may arise when taking pi(aj) due to
the controller fault model f , and the abstract states a′ that result when applying
w in aj according to the abstract model Eˆ of the environment.
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The above describes the general structure of the abstraction; in practice,
it suffices to construct a fragment of at most depth k from the initial state.
Once constructed, computing maximum probabilities for the MDP yields upper
bounds on the probability of the controller executing safely. In particular, we
have the following result (see the appendix for the proof):
Theorem 1. Given a state s ∈ S of a controller model DTMP, and an abstract
state a ∈ A of the corresponding controller abstraction MDP for which s ∈ a, we
have Prs(♦6kfail) 6 Prmaxa (♦6kfail).
This also provides a way to determine sound approximations for the two verifi-
cation problems discussed in Section 3.2, namely finding the set Ssafe0 of states
considered “safe” for a particular probability threshold psafe :
Ssafe0 ⊇ {s ∈ a | a ∈ A0 and Prmaxa (♦6kfail) < psafe}
and the worst-case probability p+S0 for a set of states S
′:
p+S′ 6 sup{Prmaxa (♦6kfail) | a ∈ A such that s ∈ a}
4 Policy Extraction and Abstraction Generation
Building upon the ideas in the previous section, we now describe the key parts
of the MOSAIC algorithm to implement this. We explain the abstract domain
used, how to extract a controller policy over abstract states from a neural network
representation, and then how to build this into a controller abstraction. We also
discuss data structures for efficient manipulation of abstract states.
Abstract Domain. The abstraction described in Section 3.3 assumes an ar-
bitrary set of abstract states A ⊆ P(S) In practice, our approach assumes
S ⊆ Rn and uses the “Box” abstract domain, where abstract states are con-
junctions of intervals (or hyperractangles), i.e., abstract states are of the form
[l1, u1]×· · ·× [ln, un], where lj , ui ∈ R are lower and upper bounds for 1 6 i 6 n.
4.1 Neural Network Policy Extraction
Controller policies are functions pi : S → Act , represented as neural networks.
To construct an abstraction (see Definition 8), we need to divide abstract states
into subregions which are consistent with pi, i.e., it picks the same action for all
states in each subregion. Our overall approach is as follows. For each action α,
we first modify the neural network, adding an action layer to help indicate the
states (network inputs) where α is chosen. Then, we adapt a branch-and-bound
style optimisation algorithm to identify these states, which builds upon methods
to approximate neural network outputs by propagating intervals through it.
Branch and bound. Branch and bound (BaB) is an optimisation algorithm
which aims to minimise (or maximise) a given objective function. It works iter-
atively, starting from the full domain of possible inputs. BaB estimates a max-
imum and minimum value for the domain using estimator functions, which are
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Fig. 1: Illustrating branch-and-bound to identify actions: 0) The upper and
lower bounds of the domain do not give a definite answer, the domain is
split into two subregions; 1) The boundaries are tighter than in the previous
iteration but the subregion is still undecided; 2) The upper bound is < 0,
the property “action taken is α” is always true in this subregion; 3) The
lower bound is > 0, the property “action takes is α” is always false in this
subregion; 4) The interval between upper and lower bound still contains 0,
the action taken in this interval is still unknown so we continue to branch.
quick to compute and approximate the real objective function by providing an
upper bound (UB) and a lower bound (LB) between which the real function lies.
The chosen bounding functions must be admissible, meaning we can guarantee
that the real function will always lie within those boundaries.
At each iteration of BaB, the domain is split (or “branched”) into multiple
parts. In the absence of any additional assumptions about the objective function,
the domain is split halfway across the largest dimension. For each part, the upper
and lower bounds are calculated and regions whose lower bounds are higher than
the current global minimum upper bound (the minimum amongst all regions’
upper bound) are discarded because, thanks to the admissibility property of
the approximate functions, they cannot ever have a value lower than the global
minimum upper bound.
The algorithm proceeds by alternating the branching phase and the bounding
phase until the two boundaries converge or the difference between the bounds is
less than an acceptable error value. After that, the current region is returned as
a solution to the optimisation problem, and the algorithm terminates.
Finding consistent regions. In order to frame the problem of identifying
areas of the domain that choose an action α as an optimisation problem, we
construct an additional layer that we call an “action layer”, and append it on
top of the network architecture. This is built in such a way that the output is
strictly positive if the output is α, and strictly negative value if not. We adopt
the construction from [7], which uses a layer to encode a correctness property to
be verified on the output of the network.
The techniques of [7] also adapt branch-and-bound algorithms, using opti-
misation to check if a correctness property is true. But our goal is different:
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Algorithm 1: Finding subregions of abstract state a for action α
1 function find action subregions(net, α, a):
2 queue = {a}
3 sat = { }
4 unsat = { }
5 mod net = add action layer (net, α)
6 while queue 6= ∅ do
7 curr domain = queue.pop()
8 ub = compute UB (mod net, cur domain)
9 lb = compute LB (mod net, cur domain)
10 if ub < 0 then
11 sat.append(curr domain)
12 else if lb > 0 then
13 unsat.append(curr domain)
14 else
15 dom1, dom2 = split (cur domain)
16 queue.append(dom1)
17 queue.append(dom2)
18 end
19 end
20 return sat,unsat
identifying areas within abstract states where action α is chosen, so we need a
different approach. Rather than minimising the modified output of the neural
network, we continue splitting domains until we find areas that consistently ei-
ther do or do not choose action α. We do not keep track of the global upper or
lower bound since we only need to consider the local ones to determine which ac-
tions are taken in each subregion. In the modified branch-and-bound algorithm,
after calculating upper and lower bounds for an interval, we have 3 cases:
– UB > LB > 0 : the agent will never choose action α for the given interval;
– 0 > UB > LB : the agent will always choose action α for the given interval;
– UB > 0 > LB : the outcome of the network is still undecided, so we split
the interval and repeat for each sub-interval.
At the end of the computation, we will have a list of intervals which satisfy the
property “the agent always take action α” and intervals which always violate it.
From these two lists we can summarise the behaviour of the agent within the
current region of the state space.
Algorithm 1 shows pseudocode for the overall procedure of splitting an ab-
stract state a into a set of subregions where an action α is always taken, and a set
where it is not. Figure 1 illustrates the algorithm executing for a 2-dimensional
input domain. The blue subregions are the ones currently being considered; the
orange bar indicates the range between computed lower and upper bounds for
the output of the network, and the red dashed line denotes the zero line.
Approximating neural network output. The branch-and-bound algorithm
requires computation of upper and lower bounds on the neural network’s output
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for a specific domain (compute UB and compute LB in Algorithm 1). To approx-
imate the output of the neural network, we use the Planet approach from [11].
The problem of approximating the output of the neural network lies in determin-
ing the output of the non-linear layers, which in this case are composed of ReLU
units. ReLU units can be seen as having 2 phases: one where the output is a
constant value if the input is less than 0 and the other where the unit act as the
identity function. The algorithm tries to infer the phase of the ReLU function
(whether x < 0 or x > 0) by constraining the range of values from the input of
the previous layers. In the case of the algorithm not being able to determine the
phase of the activation function, some linear over-approximation boundaries are
used to constrain the output of each ReLU within the section. The constraints
used are y > 0, y > x and y 6 (u ·(x−l))/(u−l) where u and l are the upper and
lower bound inferred from the boundaries of the input domain by considering
the maximum and minimum values of each input variable.
4.2 Building the Abstraction
Section 3.3 describes our approach to defining an abstract model of controller
execution, as an MDP, and Definition 8 explains the structure required of this
MDP such that it can be solved to produce probabilistic guarantees, i.e., upper
bounds on the probability of a failure occurring within some time horizon k.
Here, we provide more details on the construction of the abstraction.
Algorithm 2 shows pseudo code for the overall procedure. We start from the
initial abstract state a0, which represents the initial state of the MDP, and then
repeatedly explore the “frontier” states, whose transitions have yet to be con-
structed, stopping exploration when either depth k (the required time horizon)
or an abstract state containing a failure state is reached. For each abstract state
a to be explored, we use the techniques from the previous section to split a into
subregions of states for which the controller policy selects the same action.
Determining successor asbtract states in the MDP uses the environment ab-
straction Eˆ (see Definition 7). Since we use the “Box” abstract domain, this
means using interval arithmetic, i.e., computing the successors of the corner
points enclosing the intervals while the remaining points contained within them
are guaranteed to be contained within the enclosing successors. The definitions
of our concrete environments are therefore restricted to functions that are ex-
tensible to interval arithmetic.
4.3 Refining the Abstraction
Although the MDP constructed as described above yields upper bounds on the
finite-horizon probability of failure, we can improve the results by refining the
abstraction, i.e., further splitting some of the abstract states. The refinement step
aims to improve the precision of states which are considered unsafe (assuming
some specified probability threshold psafe), by reducing the upper bound closer
to the real probability of encountering a failure state.
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Algorithm 2: Build MDP
1 function build mdp(net, a0):
2 t = 0
3 Afrontier = {a0}
4 while t < k do
5 foreach a ∈ Afrontier do
6 foreach α ∈ Act do
7 Aα, Aα = find action subregions (net, α, a)
8 foreach aj ∈ Aα and pi:wi in f(α) do
9 a′ = Eˆ(aj , wi)
10 store (a, pi, a
′) in MDP
11 add a′ to Afrontier unless a′ ∩ fail = ∅
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 t = t+ 1
16 end
Regions of initial abstract states that are considered unsafe are split into
smaller subregions and we then recreate the branches of the MDP abstraction
from these new subregions in the same way as described in Algorithm 2. This
portion of the MDP is then resolved, to produce a more accurate prediction of
their upper bound probability of encountering a failure state, potentially discov-
ering new safe intervals in the initial abstract state. The refinement process is
executed until either there are no more unsafe regions in the initial state or the
maximum size of the intervals are less than a specified precision .
4.4 Storing and Manipulating Abstract States
Very often abstract states have a topological relationship with other abstract
states encountered previously. One abstract state could completely encapsulate
or overlap with another, but simply comparing all the possible pairs of states
would be infeasible. For this reason we need a data structure capable of reducing
the number of comparisons to just the directly neighbouring states. A tree-like
structure is the most appropriate and significant progress has been made on tree
structures capable of holding intervals. However, most of them do not scale well
for n-dimensional intervals with n > 3.
R-tree [15] is a data-structure that is able to deal with n-dimensional inter-
vals, used to handle GIS coordinates in the context of map loading where only a
specific area needs to be loaded at a time. This data structure allows us to per-
form “window queries” which involve searching for n-dimensional intervals that
intersect with the interval we are querying in O(logn(m)) time, where m is the
number of intervals stored. R-Tree organises intervals and coordinates in nested
“subdirectories” so that only areas relevant to the queried area are considered
when computing an answer.
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Here, we use an improved version of R-Tree called R*-Tree [3] which reduces
the overlapping between subdirectories at the cost of higher computational cost
of O(n log(m). This modification reduces the number of iterations required dur-
ing the queries effectively speeding up the calculation of the results. When an
abstract domain is queried for the actions the agent would choose, only the areas
which were not previously visited get computed.
5 Experimental Results
We have implemented our MOSAIC algorithm, described in Sections 3 and 4,
and evaluated it on deep reinforcement learning agents trained on two different
benchmark environments from OpenAI Gym [6]: a pendulum and a cartpole.
5.1 Implementation
Our implementation uses a combination of Python and Java. The neural network
architecture is handled through the Pytorch library [33], interval arithmetic is
done with pyinterval [32] and graph analysis with networkX [30]. Abstract
domain operations are done with Rtree [34], building on libspatialindex [29].
Constructing and solving MDPs is done using PRISM [20], though its Java API,
built into a Python wrapper using py4j [31].
5.2 Benchmarks and Policy Learning
We learn and verify controllers for the pendulum and cartpole environments,
modified to include probabilistic controller faults: all actions are “sticky”, erro-
neously being executed twice with probability p = 0.2.
Pendulum. The pendulum environment consist of a pole pivoting around a
point at one of its ends. The agent can apply a rotational force to the left or
to the right with the aim of balancing the pole in its upright position. The pole
is underactuated which means that the agent can only recover to its upright
position when the pole is within a certain angle. For this reason, if the pole goes
beyond a threshold from which it cannot recover, the episode terminates and
the agent is given a large negative reward. Each state is composed of 2 variables:
the angle position and the angular velocity of the pole.
Cartpole. The cartpole environment features a pole being balanced on top of a
cart that can either move left or right. The cartpole can only move within fixed
bounds and the pole on top of it cannot recover its upright state after its angle
exceeds a given threshold. In this problem the size of each state is 4 variables:
the position of the cart in the X axis, the speed of the cart, the angle of the pole
and the angular velocity of the pole.
Policy construction. For the policy neural networks, we use 3 fully connected
layers of size 64, followed by an output layer whose size equals the number of
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Fig. 2: Heatmaps of failure probability upper bounds for subregions of initial
states for the pendulum benchmark. Left: the initial abstraction; Right: the
abstraction after 50 refinement steps.
controller actions in the benchmark. The training of the agent is performed by
using the Deep Q-network algorithm [22] with prioritised experience replay [25]
which tries to predict the action value in each state and choosing the most valu-
able one. For both environments we train the agent for 6000 episodes, limiting
the maximum number of timesteps for each episode to 1000. We linearly decay
the epsilon in the first 20% of the total episodes up to a minimum of 0.01 which
we keep constant for the rest of the training. The remaining hyperparameters
remain the same as suggested in [22] and [25].
5.3 Results
We have run the MOSAIC algorithm on the benchmark controller policies de-
scribed above. We build and solve the MDP abstraction to determine upper
bounds on failure probabilities for different parts of the state space. Figure 2
(left) shows a heatmap of the probabilities for various subregions of the initial
states of the pendulum benchmark, within a time horizon of 7 steps. Figure 2
(right) shows the heatmap for a more precise abstraction, obtained after 50 steps
of refinement. We do not fix a specific probability threshold psafe here, but the
right-hand part (in blue) has upper bound zero, so is “safe” for any psafe > 0. The
refined abstraction discovers new areas which are safe due to improved (lower)
upper bounds in many regions.
Results for the cartpole example are harder to visualise since the the state
space has 4 dimensions. Figure 3 shows a scatterplot of failure probability bounds
within 7 time steps for the subregions of the initial state space; the intervals have
been projected to two dimensions using principal component analysis, the size
of the bubble representing the volume occupied by the interval. We also plot,
in Figure 4, a histogram showing how the probabilities are distributed across
the volume of the subregions of the initial states. For a given value psafe on the
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x-axis, our analysis yields a probabilistic guarantee of safety for the sum of all
volumes shown to the left of this point.
Scalability and efficiency. Lastly, we briefly discuss the scalabilty and effi-
ciency of our prototype implementation of MOSAIC. Our experiments were run
on a 4-core 4.2 GHz PC with 64 GB RAM running Ubuntu 18.04. We success-
fully built and solved abstractions up to time horizons of 7 time-steps in both
benchmark environments. For the pendulum problem, the size of the MDP built
ranged up to approximately 160,000 states after building the initial abstrac-
tion, reaching approximately 225,000 states after 50 steps of refinement. For the
cartpole problem, the number of states after 7 time-steps ranged up to approxi-
mately 75,000 states. The time required was roughly 50 minutes and 30 minutes,
respectively.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a novel approach called MOSAIC for verifying deep reinforce-
ment learning systems operating in environments where probabilistic controller
faults may occur. We formalised the verification problem as a finite-horizon anal-
ysis of a continuous-space discrete-time Markov process and showed how to use a
combination of abstract interpretation and probabilistic model checking to com-
pute upper bounds on failure probabilities. We implemented our techniques and
successfully applied them to neural network policies learnt for two benchmark
control problems. Future work will involve more sophisticated refinement and ab-
straction approaches, including the use of lower bounds to guide improvements
in abstraction precision, and investigations with other abstract domains.
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Appendix (Proof of Theorem 1)
We give here a proof of Theorem 1, from Section 3.3, which states that:
Given a state s ∈ S of a controller model DTMP, and an abstract state a ∈ A
of the corresponding controller abstraction MDP for which s ∈ a, we have:
Prs(♦6kfail) 6 Prmaxa (♦6kfail)
By the definition of Prmaxa (·), it suffices show that there is some policy σ in the
MDP such that:
Prs(♦6kfail) 6 Prσa(♦6kfail) (1)
Recall that, in the construction of the MDP (see Definition 8), an abstract state
a is associated with a partition of subsets aj of a, each of which is used to define
the j-labelled choice in state a. Let σ be the policy that picks in each state s
(regardless of history) the unique index js such that s ∈ ajs .
The probabilities Prσa(♦6kfail) for this policy, starting in abstract state a, are
defined similarly to those for discrete-time Markov processes (see Section 3.2):
Prσa(♦6kfail) =

1 if a |= fail
0 if a 6|= fail ∧ k=0∑
a′∈Supp(P(a,js,·))
P(a, js, a
′)·Pra′(♦6k−1fail) otherwise.
Since this is defined recursively, we prove (1) by induction over k.
First, for the case k = 0, from the computation of Prs(♦6kfail) (see Section 3.2),
we have that Prs(♦60fail) is equal to 1 if s |= fail and 0 otherwise. The same
holds for Pra(♦60fail), as stated above. From Definition 8, s |= fail implies
a |= fail . Therefore, Prs(♦60fail) 6 Prσa(♦60fail).
Next, for the inductive step, we will assume, as the inductive hypothesis, that
Prs′(♦6k−1fail) 6 Prσa′(♦6k−1fail) for s′ ∈ S and a′ ∈ A with s′ ∈ a′. If
a |= fail then Prσa(♦6kfail) = 1 > Pra(♦6kfail). Otherwise we have:
Prσa(♦6kfail)
=
∑
a′∈Supp(P(a,js,·)) P(a, js, a
′) · Pra′(♦6k−1fail) by defn. of Prσa(♦6kfail)
=
∑
w∈Act∗ f(pi(aj))(w) · Pr Eˆ(aj ,w)(♦6k−1fail) by defn. of P(a, j, a′)
=
∑
w∈Act∗ f(pi(s))(w) · Pr Eˆ(aj ,w)(♦6k−1fail) since s ∈ aj
>
∑
w∈Act∗ f(pi(s))(w) · PrE(s,w)(♦6k−1fail) by induction and since, by
Defn. 7, E(s, w) ∈ Eˆ(aj , w)
=
∑
s′∈Supp(P(s,·)) P(s, s
′) · Prs′(♦6k−1fail) by defn. of P(s, s′)
= Prs(♦6kfail) by defn. of Prs(♦6kfail)
which completes the proof.
